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INTRODUCTION 
“As, then, the physician ought to be called to account by 
physicians, so ought men in general to be called to account 
by their peers.”1 – Aristotle 
It is beyond dispute that the “standard of care” (existence of, 
compliance with, and deviation from) is the evidentiary focus of the 
medical negligence trial.2 A deviation from the standard of care, 
proximately causing injury, is a prerequisite to the imposition of 
medical negligence liability.3 The standard of care is not a singular 
concept, or perhaps more specifically, is not singularly defined. 
Various versions of the standard of care have existed in various 
jurisdictions at various times, including: 
 The performance of medical care skillfully and 
safely;4 
 “[R]easonable skill and diligence . . . such as 
thoroughly educated surgeons ordinarily employ.”5 
 “[S]uch care and diligence as men in general, of 
common prudence and ordinary attention, usually 
                                                                                                                 
 1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, at 123 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford Clarendon Press rev. ed. 
1906) (c. 350 B.C.E.); see also Shea v. Phillips, 98 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. 1957); WILL DURANT, THE 
STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 98 (1961); Edson L. Haines, Courts and Doctors, 30 CAN. B. REV. 483, 489–90 
(1952); F. J. M. P. Somville, P. L. O. Broos & R. Van Hee, Some Notes on Medical Liability in Ancient 
Times, 110 ACTA CHIRURGICA BELGICA 405, 406 (2010). 
 2. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 76–91 (3d ed. 2015) for an excellent overall 
discussion of the standard of care. For a historical perspective, see Brian K. Cooke, Elizabeth Worsham 
& Gary M. Reisfield, The Elusive Standard of Care, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 358 (2017); 
Charles Markowitz, Medical Standard of Care Jurisprudence as Evolutionary Process: Implication 
Under Managed Care, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 59 (2002); Peter Moffett & Gregory 
Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History and Definitions: The Bad and Good News, 12 W. J. 
EMERGENCY MED. 109 (2011). 
 3. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 87–88. 
 4. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 91 (Conn. 1794). 
 5. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 268 (1853). 
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apply in similar cases, and not that extraordinary 
care which might be applied in such a case by very 
careful and prudent persons.”6  
 “[T]he method of treatment used is supported by a 
respectable minority of physicians, as long as the 
physician has adhered to the acceptable procedures 
of administering the treatment as espoused by the 
minority.”7  
 “[T]he prescribed treatment or procedure has been 
approved by one group of medical experts even 
though an alternate school of thought recommends 
another approach, or it is agreed among experts that 
alternative treatments and practices are 
acceptable.”8 
 “[T]he physician must treat the patient with ‘such 
reasonable diligence, skill, competence, and 
prudence as are practiced by minimally competent 
physicians in the same specialty.’”9  
 Physicians must “possess and apply the knowledge, 
skill[,] and care which a reasonably well-qualified 
physician in the same or similar community would 
bring to a similar case.”10  
 “A [physician] must possess and use the knowledge, 
skill, and care ordinarily used by a reasonably 
careful [physician]. The failure to do something that 
a reasonably careful [physician] would do, or the 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.H. 460, 472 (1853). 
 7. Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), superseded by statute, Medical 
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02 (1986) 
(repealed 2003), as stated in Price v. Hurt, 711 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). 
 8. Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 965 (Pa. 1992) (explaining what is known as the “two schools 
doctrine” in medical malpractice cases). 
 9. McCarty v. Mladineo, 636 So. 2d 377, 380 (Miss. 1994) (citing Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 
(Miss. 1985)). 
 10. Jackson v. Graham, 523 N.E.2d 525, 532–33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (locality rule). But see Marc 
Ginsberg, The Locality Rule Lives! Why? Using Modern Medicine to Eradicate an Unhealthy Law, 61 
DRAKE L. REV. 321, 323–24 (2013). 
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doing of something that a reasonably careful 
[physician] would not do, under circumstances 
similar to those shown by the evidence, is 
‘professional negligence.’”11  
Whichever definition is utilized from the standard of care spectrum 
(locality rule on one end of the spectrum, national standard of care on 
the other end), it is fundamental to the law of medical negligence that 
expert testimony is required to prove the existence of the standard of 
care, deviation from (or compliance with) the standard of care, and a 
deviation from the standard of care proximately causing the patient’s 
injury.12 The jury is simply not permitted to conclude that a physician 
was negligent in a fashion similar to that utilized in a garden-variety, 
non-professional negligence case.13  
Of course, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702) governs 
expert testimony in the federal district courts and provides as follows: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a)   the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c)   the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and 
                                                                                                                 
 11. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 105.01 [hereinafter ILL. INSTRUCTIONS]. The Notes 
on Use section of the Pattern Jury Instruction states, “The locality rule has largely faded from current 
practice. If there is no issue of an applicable local standard of care, the locality language should be 
deleted.” Id. Therefore, Section 105.01 of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions reflects the national 
standard of care. See Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations 
in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 
257, 258 (2013) (“Since the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of states have amended their substantive 
malpractice laws to adopt such national rules.”); see also Cooke, supra note 2, at 358. 
 12. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 87. 
 13. See, e.g., ILL. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 11, § 105.01 (“You must not attempt to determine how 
a reasonably careful [physician] would act from any personal knowledge you may have.”). 
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(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.14  
Most, but not all, states have adopted the standards encompassed 
by FRE 702.15  
It is significant to note that FRE 702 does not specifically qualify 
or disqualify any particular type of expert witness. Typically, the 
medical negligence plaintiff will produce a physician-expert witness 
to establish the standard of care applicable to the defendant-
physician, deviation from the standard of care, and the resulting 
damages.16 This traditional approach to the use of a physician-expert 
witness was well explained almost fifty years ago by Professor John 
Waltz: 
The plaintiff in all but the most self-evident medical 
malpractice case is required to produce in support of his 
claim the testimony of qualified medical experts. This is 
true because the technical aspects of his claim will 
ordinarily be far beyond the competence of the lay jurors 
whose duty it is to assess the defendant[-]doctor’s conduct. 
And the plaintiff himself, lacking the training and 
experience that would qualify him to characterize the 
defendant’s conduct, is incompetent to supply guidance to 
the jurors.17  
                                                                                                                 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 15. See Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye—A State-by-State Comparison, EXPERT INST., 
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/ 
[https://perma.cc/GVD3-5SKW] (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
 16. Joseph Kelner, The Silent Doctors—The Conspiracy of Silence, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 119, 122–23 
(1970). 
 17. Jon R. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 
18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 409 (1969). 
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Of course, the qualified medical expert referred to by Professor 
Waltz is understood to be a physician.18 As one commentator 
explained, “It takes one to know one.”19  
The source of the applicable standard of care in a specific medical 
negligence claim is multifaceted. The testifying expert witness, when 
explaining the applicable standard of care, “would draw upon his 
own education and practical frame of reference as well as upon 
relevant medical thinking, as manifested by literature, educational 
resources and information available to practitioners, and experiences 
of similarly situated members of the profession.”20 Accordingly, in 
typical medical negligence litigation, the plaintiff’s expert witness 
testifying regarding the existence of and the defendant-physician’s 
deviation from the standard of care would be a physician. 
Why, then, have courts permitted non-physicians to give standard 
of care testimony against physicians? Cross-disciplinary standard of 
care testimony against physicians has been provided by an array of 
non-physicians: a biomechanical engineer,21  a pharmacist,22 a 
nurse,23 pharmacologists,24 and a pharmacologist/toxicologist.25 Is 
cross-disciplinary standard of care expert testimony an aberration? 
Does it reveal a failure of trial courts to understand the practice of 
medicine and knowledge of the standard of care? These topics are the 
primary focus of this paper. 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See Kelner, supra note 16, at 122–23 (“Thus, to prove a doctor’s careless departure from 
prevailing standards of care usually requires that another doctor testify against the defending doctor. It 
takes one to know one.”). 
 19. Id. at 123; see also John C. Drapp III, The National Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice 
Actions: Does Small Area Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction?, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 95, 97–
98 (2003) (“Generally, the expert or experts will be the same type of doctor as the defendant.”). 
 20. Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The “Accepted 
Practice” Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1241–42 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 21. Trees v. Ordonez, 311 P.3d 848, 851 (Or. 2013). 
 22. Romero v. Hanisch, No. CIV. 08–5040–JLV, 2010 WL 5020657, at *11 (D.S.D. 2010). 
 23. Avret v. McCormick, 271 S.E.2d 832, 833 (Ga. 1980). 
 24. Garvey v. O’Donoghue, 530 A.2d 1141, 1146 (D.C. 1987); Pratt v. Stein, 444 A.2d 674, 706 (Pa. 
1982), superseded by statute, Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act, 40 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 1303.512, as stated in Deleon v. Wise, 175 A.3d 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 
 25. Thompson v. Carter, 518 So. 2d 609, 613 (Miss. 1987). 
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To be fair, it should be noted that the reasoning of some courts to 
permit or exclude non-physician, cross-disciplinary expert testimony 
may be informed by state rules of evidence, rules defining expert 
witness requirements, or rules pertaining to lawsuit filing 
requirements. Those rules may be unclear and require interpretation. 
Therefore, rules such as these are not the focus of this paper. Instead, 
this paper focuses on how courts understand medicine, the standard 
of care, and the professional, experiential distinction between 
physicians and non-physicians. Ultimately, this paper recommends 
that trial courts should not permit non-physicians to opine that 
defendant-physicians have deviated from the applicable standard of 
care while recognizing that as more medical care is provided by non-
physicians, courts may decline this recommendation. 
I.   The Practice of Medicine 
To address the propriety of cross-disciplinary expert testimony, 
some context is necessary. Physician-defendants in medical 
negligence litigation have allegedly violated the standard of care in 
their respective medical practices.26 The practice of medicine has 
been defined or explained as follows: 
 “According to philology, logic, and common sense, 
it is simply the art of healing . . . .”27  
 “The practice of medicine in its broadest sense 
includes the whole relationship of the physician 
with his patient.”28  
 “The practice of medicine is a human endeavor.”29 
 “[M]edical practice requires the engagement of one 
person with another and realizes that authentic 
engagement is transformative for all participants.”30 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Moffett & Moore, supra note 2, at 109. 
 27. What Constitutes the Practice of Medicine, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 463, 463 (2008). 
 28. Francis W. Peabody, The Care of the Patient, 88 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 877, 877 (1927). 
 29. Herbert M. Swick, Toward a Normative Definition of Medical Professionalism, 75 ACAD. MED. 
612, 614 (2000). 
 30. Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: A Model for Empathy, Reflection, Profession, and Trust, 286 
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 “[T]he practice of medicine is the applying of 
medical or surgical agencies for the purpose of 
preventing, relieving, or curing disease, or aiding 
natural functions, or modifying or removing the 
results of physical injury.”31  
Therefore, the practice of medicine contemplates physician 
training, a physician-patient relationship, and patient care. As a 
necessary corollary, physician judgment is implicated. 
Non-physicians, even those who provide patient care, simply do not 
experience health care as physicians do. It is fair to question how a 
court might permit standard of care testimony against a physician by 
a non-physician. This paper now seeks to survey the landscape of 
non-physician experts and explore how courts have permitted and 
excluded their standard of care testimony against physicians. 
II.   The Biomechanical Engineer 
In Trees v. Ordonez, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a 
biomechanical engineer properly testified that a neurosurgeon 
violated the standard of care in his placement of surgical hardware 
during the performance of “an anterior cervical decompression and 
fusion on [the] plaintiff.”32 In rather extensive detail, the court 
described the hardware utilized by the neurosurgeon and the process 
of its surgical placement.33 Post-operatively, the plaintiff suffered 
“pain, difficulty swallowing, and the sensation of a plate in her 
throat.”34 Furthermore, she “had additional symptoms, including 
contamination of the surgical wound with oral bacteria and amylase, 
which indicated that the plaintiff’s esophagus may have been 
perforated.”35 After additional surgeries, further complications, and 
                                                                                                                 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1897, 1898 (2001). 
 31. Harry B. Hutchins, What Is the Practice of Medicine?, 4 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373 (1906). 
 32. Trees v. Ordonez, 311 P.3d 848, 850, 856 (Or. 2013). See generally Michael J. Bolesta, Glenn R. 
Rechtine, II & Ann Marie Chrin, Three- and Four-Level Anterior Cervical Discectomy and Fusion with 
Plate Fixation, 25 SPINE 2040 (2000). 
 33. Trees, 311 P.3d at 850–51. 
 34. Id. at 851. 
 35. Id. 
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the inability to continue her employment, the plaintiff filed a medical 
negligence complaint, alleging the improper placement of the 
surgical hardware caused it “to erode and/or perforate plaintiff’s 
esophagus or hypopharynx.”36 
At trial, plaintiff produced a biomechanical engineering expert.37 
Biomechanics “exists at the crossroads of engineering and biology, 
focusing on how mechanical energy affects human tissue.”38 The 
biomechanical engineering expert “lecture[d] medical residents who 
[were] learning to become orthopedists on various topics . . . .”39 The 
expert had “conduct[ed] his own research and ha[d] developed an 
implant system for spinal surgeries.”40 He “watched and participated 
in the placement of a Synthes plate on a cadaver but had not 
participated in such a surgery involving a living person.”41 
Significantly, he testified as to the defendant’s improper application 
of the surgical hardware.42 The plaintiff did not produce an expert 
neurosurgeon to opine that the defendant violated the applicable 
standard of care.43 “[T]he only neurosurgeon who testified during 
[the] plaintiff’s case[,] [a defense witness who testified out of order,] 
indicated that [the] defendant had not breached the standard of 
care.”44 Not surprisingly, “[a]t the close of [the] plaintiff’s evidence, 
[the] defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the case 
could not go to the jury in the absence of expert testimony that 
defendant had failed to conform to the standard of care.”45 Defendant 
also urged lack of causation evidence.46 The motion for directed 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Loren Peck, How Sound Is the Science? Applying Daubert to Biomechanical Experts’ Inquiry 
Causation Opinions, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1068 (2016). 
 39. Trees, 311 P.3d at 851. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (punctuation omitted). 
 42. Id. at 852. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Trees, 311 P.3d at 852. 
 46. Id. 
9
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verdict was granted due to the plaintiff’s lack of standard of care 
expert testimony.47The court of appeals affirmed.48  
The Supreme Court of Oregon noted that “[n]either party point[ed] 
to an Oregon case where a nonmedical expert’s testimony has been 
held to be sufficient—or insufficient—to establish a medical doctor’s 
standard of care and the failure to meet that standard.”49 The court 
noted a jurisdictional split on the issue50 and then announced that “in 
determining the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice 
cases, our cases have looked to substance, rather than form, and have 
focused on the knowledge of the expert . . . rather than on an expert’s 
particular medical degree or area of specialty.”51 For purposes of 
Oregon law, “the central inquiry . . . is whether the expert has 
sufficient knowledge of the methods used by the practitioner in the 
circumstances to testify regarding the standard of care.”52  
This analytical approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Oregon 
is reasonable—the problem is in its application. The plaintiff’s 
biomechanical engineering expert had lectured medical residents and 
physicians, “worked with physicians, . . . developed an implant 
system for spinal surgeries, and . . . [conducted] laboratory research 
comparing the Synthes plate to other similar plates, which included 
both watching and participating in the placement of a Synthes plate 
on a cadaver.”53 The Supreme Court of Oregon held this expert 
testimony sufficient to implicate the standard of care for a 
neurosurgeon.54  
The concern here is not a biomechanical engineer’s lack of 
knowledge of surgical devices. The concern is that the biomechanical 
engineer does not treat patients and does not experience the 
circumstances confronted by a neurosurgeon. The biomechanical 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 853. 
 48. Trees v. Ordonez, 279 P.3d 337, 345 (Or. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 311 P.3d 848 (Or. 2013). 
 49. Trees, 311 P.3d at 854. 
 50. Id. at 854–55. 
 51. Id. at 855. 
 52. Id. at 856. 
 53. Id. at 857–58. 
 54. Id. at 859. 
10
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engineer is not required to exercise surgical judgment based upon the 
neurosurgeon’s experience and training.55 The biomechanical 
engineer, therefore, is not obligated to comply with the medical 
standard of care in the course of treating a patient. Accordingly, 
courts should not allow biomechanical engineering experts to opine 
on a physician’s deviation from (or compliance with) the standard of 
care.56  
III.   The Psychologist 
Psychology has been defined as “the study of the mind and 
behavior . . . .”57. Psychologists treat patients with depression, anger, 
anxiousness, chronic conditions, stress, and addictions and “are also 
trained to administer and interpret a number of tests and 
assessments . . . that can help diagnose a condition or tell more about 
the way a person thinks, feels[,] and behaves.”58 A commentator has 
suggested: “One of psychology’s main achievements has been the 
development and the extensive reliance on objective, quantifiable 
means of assessing human talents, abilities, strengths, and 
weaknesses.”59 This commentator has also noted that “[t]he mission 
of our psychological practitioners of relieving the suffering of those 
with various forms of mental illness by means of appropriately 
delivered types of psychological therapy has proven successful.”60 
Psychologists are not medical doctors and typically earn Ph.D, 
Psy.D, or Ed.D degrees.61 Psychiatrists have received medical school 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See William F. Chandler, What Is Quality in Neurosurgery?, 56 CLINICAL NEUROSURGERY 45, 
46 (2009). 
 56. As to whether a biomechanical engineer should be permitted to opine on injury causation, see 
Peck, supra note 38, at 1115. 
 57. Christian Nordqvist, What Is Psychology and What Does It Involve?, MED. NEWS TODAY (last 
updated Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/154874.php 
[https://perma.cc/GZP9-94CW]. 
 58. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, What Do Practicing Psychologists Do?, 
http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/about-psychologists.aspx [https://perma.cc/64HM-PE76] (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2018). 
 59. Philip G. Zimbardo, Does Psychology Make a Significant Difference in Our Lives?, 59 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 339, 341 (2004). 
 60. Id. at 342. 
 61. Gavin Ryan Shafron, Prescription Privileges and the Ethics Code: A Modern Look into the Right 
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training and have “the knowledge and training to evaluate underlying 
medical problems or drug effects that could cause emotional or 
behavioral symptoms.”62 Recently, it has been explained that “[t]he 
primary distinguishing element between the practice of clinical 
psychiatry and applied psychology is the right to prescribe 
psychotropic medications . . . .”63 These “medications include 
antipsychotics, antidepressants[,] and benzodiazepines[,] and these 
are commonly prescribed to older people in residential settings, 
particularly those with dementia, to manage [behavioral] and 
psychological symptoms of dementia . . . .”64  
Medical literature suggests a shortage of psychiatrists in the United 
States.65 Scholars have urged that this shortage has provided the fuel 
for the argument in favor of prescription privileges for 
psychologists.66 Some of the states have authorized psychologists to 
prescribe medications.67 The opposing view, however, “argues that 
one danger of allowing psychologists prescription privileges is that 
there is no way to ensure psychologists’ understanding of potentially 
harmful interactions with patients’ non-psychotropic prescription 
medications, constituting systemic malpractice.”68 Another argument 
in opposition to the prescription privilege is “that the nature of the 
practice of applied psychology would dramatically change, 
                                                                                                                 
to Prescribe Among Applied Psychologists, 15 GRADUATE STUDENT J. PSYCHOL. 95, 95 (2014). 
 62. Tony Rehagen, Psychologist or Psychiatrist: Which Is Right for You?, WEBMD, 
https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/features/psychologist-or-psychiatrist-which-for-you#1 
[https://perma.cc/H2SU-M26H] (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
 63. Shafron, supra note 61, at 95. 
 64. Stephanie L. Harrison et al., Psychotropic Medications in Older People in Residential Care 
Facilities and Associations with Quality of Life: A Cross-Sectional Study, 18 BMC GERIATRICS 60 
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1186/s12877-018-0752-0 [https://perma.cc/VT78-WLMW]; see also Pamela 
L. Lindsey, Psychotropic Medication Use Among Older Adults: What All Nurses Need to Know, 35 J. 
GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 28, 29 (2009). 
 65. See, e.g., William Goldman, Is There a Shortage of Psychiatrists?, 52 PSYCH. SERVICES 1587, 
1589 (2001); Eugene H. Rubin & Charles F. Zorumski, Perspective: Upcoming Paradigm Shifts for 
Psychiatry in Clinical Care, Research and Education, 87 ACAD. MED. 261, 261 (2012); Shafron, supra 
note 61, at 96. 
 66. Shafron, supra note 61, at 96. 
 67. See AM. MED. ASS’N ADVISORY RES. CTR., COMPARISON OF PRESCRIBING STATUTES: ILLINOIS, 
NEW MEXICO, AND LOUISIANA (2015), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-
browser/premium/arc/comparison-psych-prescribing-laws_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2GQ-BL6H]. 
 68. Shafron, supra note 61, at 97. 
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transforming applied psychologists into lesser-educated psychiatrists 
and thereby damaging and potentially eliminating the field of clinical 
psychiatry.”69 With this context, should courts permit psychologists 
to testify as to deviations from the standard of care by physicians 
regarding medication treatment? 
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this issue in Lundgren v. 
Eustermann.70 Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-
physician “was negligent in treating . . . mental and emotional illness 
with the drug Thorazine.”71 The defendant was a family physician72 
with many years of practice experience.73 The trial court ruled that 
the plaintiffs’ psychology expert “was not qualified to give an 
opinion on the standard of medical care involved and granted [the] 
defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment . . . .”74 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the ruling,75 and it became one 
of the issues on further review by the Minnesota Supreme Court.76 
The plaintiffs’ psychology expert’s opinions, expressed in answers 
to interrogatories, were as follows: 
Thorazine, an antipsychotic drug, was less appropriate for 
[the plaintiff] than antidepressant drugs; that the continued 
prescription of Thorazine over a [six]-year period was 
inappropriate; that the treating physician has an obligation 
to monitor the patient for adverse side effects from use of 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. Lundgren v. Eustermann, 370 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 1985). 
 71. Id. Thorazine is an antipsychotic medication. See Jeffrey M. Witkin, Obstacles to the Discovery 
of Medicines for Psychiatric Disorders in Modern Times, 14 CNS NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS—DRUG 
TARGETS 4, 5 (2015); see also Donovan T. Maust & Helen C. Kales, Medicating Distress, 177 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 42, 42 (2017). 
 72. Family physicians “fulfill the generalist function in medicine, which the American people 
wanted and which suffered with the growth of subspecialization after World War II.” James C. Martin et 
al., The Future of Family Medicine: A Collaborative Project of the Family Medicine Community, 2 
ANNALS FAM. MED. S3, S5 (2004). 
 73. Lundgren, 370 N.W.2d at 879. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Lundgren v. Eustermann, 356 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), rev’d 370 N.W.2d 877 
(Minn. 1985). 
 76. Lundgren, 370 N.W.2d at 879. 
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the drug; that there was no medical record that [the 
defendant] had monitored for side effects; that the patient 
over the [six]-year period had reported various symptoms 
which “could be” related to Thorazine treatment; that 
customary medical treatment would require a weighing of 
the relative benefits and risks of the continued use of a 
particular medication; and that, under the circumstances, 
the continued use of Thorazine was not acceptable medical 
practice.77  
The Minnesota Supreme Court found a lack of the necessary 
foundation for these opinions, essentially due to the fact that the 
plaintiffs’ psychology expert was not a physician.78 Despite his 
knowledge of Thorazine, he lacked the “practical experience or 
knowledge of what physicians do.”79 He had “never prescribed 
Thorazine for a patient”80 and “[did] not know how physicians 
themselves customarily use Thorazine.”81  
Even if the plaintiffs’ expert in Lundgren had prescription 
privileges as a psychologist, he continued to lack the experience and 
training of a physician. Certainly, with prescription privileges to 
consider, it is only an assumption that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
would have reached the same conclusion. That conclusion—
prohibiting the psychologist expert from testifying as to the deviation 
from the medical standard of care—was appropriate. 
Not long after Lundgren, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
considered a similar issue in Bell v. Hart. In Bell, the plaintiff’s 
physician prescribed her “Elavil, a tricyclic anti-depressant,”82 
following plaintiff’s hospitalization. After alleged complications 
from the medication, the plaintiff filed a medical negligence claim, 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. at 880. 
 78. Id. at 881. 
 79. Id. at 880. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Bell v. Hart, 516 So. 2d 562, 563 (Ala. 1987). 
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urging the negligent prescription of Elavil.83 One of the plaintiff’s 
expert witnesses was a psychologist who had completed course work 
and “research related to the prescription, use, dosage, and 
administration of various drugs under different circumstances.”84 He 
had “taught college[-]level courses in psychopharmacology, which is 
related to the use, dosage, and administration of drugs and the effects 
of drugs upon individuals who have taken them under varying 
circumstances, including, but not limited to, psychiatric drugs that 
might affect the central nervous system.”85 He had consulted and 
taught regarding drugs such as Elavil. In his deposition, he “testified 
that [the defendant] deviated from the accepted standard of care in 
the medical community for the prescription, dosage, and 
administration of the drug Elavil to the plaintiff . . . .”86 The trial 
court reviewed the deposition testimony of the psychologist and 
another expert and granted a motion in limine to exclude the 
testimony.87 Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant-physician.88 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama referred to Lundgren, 
and followed the lead of the Supreme Court of Minnesota. In Bell, 
therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that “we cannot 
permit a non[-]physician, who cannot legally prescribe a drug, to 
testify concerning the standard of care that should be exercised in the 
prescription of the drug.”89 Although the Supreme Court of Alabama 
referred to the need for expert medical testimony,90 it may have left 
open for discussion the question of whether a psychologist with a 
prescription privilege would be permitted to testify as to a 
physician’s alleged deviation from the standard of care. The point 
here is that, notwithstanding a psychologist’s prescription privilege, a 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at 564. 
 84. Id. at 565. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Bell, 516 So. 2d at 565. 
 89. Id. at 570. 
 90. Id. 
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psychologist is not a physician, does not have the experience or 
training of a physician, and should not be permitted to give standard 
of care opinions against a physician. 
IV.   The Dentist 
The American Dental Association (ADA) has defined dentists as 
“doctors who specialize in oral health.”91 The ADA has identified the 
basic responsibilities of dentists as follows: 
 Diagnosing oral diseases. 
 Promoting oral health and disease prevention. 
 Creating treatment plans to maintain or restore the 
oral health of their patients. 
 Interpreting x-rays and diagnostic tests. 
 Ensuring the safe administration of anesthetics. 
 Monitoring growth and development of the teeth 
and jaws. 
 Performing surgical procedures on the teeth, bone, 
and soft tissues of the oral cavity.92  
There are, however, dental specialties, and oral and maxillofacial 
surgery is one of them.93 It “is a branch of dentistry that deals with 
the diagnosis and treatment of oral conditions requiring surgical 
intervention.”94 In the United States, maxillofacial surgery is 
performed by dentists with this specialty and by physicians.95  
Courts of review have examined efforts by plaintiffs to utilize 
dentists-maxillofacial surgeons as expert witnesses (or potential 
expert witnesses) against physicians.96 The Kansas Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 91. AM. DENTAL ASS’N., DENTISTS: DOCTORS OF ORAL HEALTH (2018), 
https://www.ada.org/en/about-the-ada/dentists-doctors-of-oral-health [https://perma.cc/4CRJ-6F3W]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See generally Kishore Nayak, Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery: It’s Future as a Specialty, 10 J. 
MAXILLOFACIAL ORAL SURGERY 281 (2011); Rahul Tiwari, Chaitanya Pendyala, G. Gurukarthik & 
Arka Bhattacharjee, History of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery—A Review, 16 IOSR J. DENTAL & MED. 
SCI. 99 (2017). 
 94. Tiwari et al., supra note 93, at 99. 
 95. Nayak, supra note 93, at 281. 
 96. Tompkins v. Bise, 910 P.2d 185, 193 (Kan. 1996); Hinebaugh v. Garrett Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 51 
A.3d 673, 681 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012). 
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permitted a dentist-maxillofacial surgeon to testify that a physician-
surgeon deviated from the standard of care applicable to an oral-
maxillofacial surgeon who treated jaw fractures.97 The Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals held that a dentist-maxillofacial surgeon 
was not permitted “to express an opinion about the standard of care 
that governs a family medicine doctor or a radiologist . . . .”98  
The specialty-trained dentist-expert opining on the standard of care 
applicable to a physician-surgeon is likely a product of a “turf war” 
between the professions.99 Courts may begin to recognize dentists, 
particularly those with specialty training, as oral physicians.100 These 
dentists would have training and experience coextensive with 
physicians and would be familiar with the applicable standard of 
care. 
V.   The Chiropractor 
It has been urged “[a] that chiropractic’s identity is as a provider of 
spine care.”101 The focus of this care is subluxation,102 previously 
defined by the Association of Chiropractic Colleges as “a complex of 
functional and/or structural and/or pathological articular changes that 
compromise neural integrity and may influence organ system 
function and general health.”103 A survey of North American 
orthopedic surgeons focusing on their attitudes toward chiropractors 
revealed a “majority was also of the opinion that chiropractors 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Tompkins, 910 P.2d at 192. Regarding the treatment of jaw fractures, see Renato Valiati et al., 
The Treatment of Condylar Fractures: To Open or Not to Open? A Critical Review of This Controversy, 
5 INT’L. J. MED. SCI. 313 (2008). 
 98. Hinebaugh, 51 A.3d at 690. 
 99. See Christopher J. Gearon, Medicine’s Turf Wars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 31, 2005), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/8031377_Medicine’s_turf_wars. [https://perma.cc/X6RW-
K5VP]. 
 100. See David A. Nash, The Oral Physician . . . Creating a New Oral Health Professional for a New 
Century, 59 J. DENTAL EDUC. 587, 595 (1995). 
 101. Craig F. Nelson et al., Chiropractic as Spine Care: A Model for the Profession, 13 
CHIROPRACTIC & OSTEOPATHY 9, 9 (2005). 
 102. Jan Hartvigsen & Simon French, What is Chiropractic?, 25 CHIROPRACTIC & MANUAL 
THERAPIES 30, 30 (2017). 
 103. Edward F. Owens, Chiropractic Subluxation Assessment: What the Research Tells Us, 46 J. 
CAN. CHIROPRACTIC ASS’N. 215, 215 (2002). 
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provide unnecessary treatment, engage in overly aggressive 
marketing, breed dependency in patients on short-term symptomatic 
relief, and do not treat in accordance with evidence-based 
practices.”104 It would not be surprising if physicians were not 
enamored with chiropractic education and training. Criticism of 
chiropractic education has been reported in the chiropractic 
literature.105 It is fair to suggest that chiropractic education and 
training do not approximate medical education. 
It would seem intuitively obvious that a chiropractor should not be 
permitted to give standard of care testimony against a defendant-
physician in a medical negligence case. This was the conclusion of 
the Court of Appeals of Indiana in Stackhouse v. Scanlon.106 Here, 
the patient was hospitalized for leg pain, had a suspected pulmonary 
embolism,107 was anticoagulated, and was “diagnosed with septic 
shock syndrome.”108 Apparently, during the course of a catheter 
placement to monitor blood flow, “a large vein was perforated.”109 
The patient died shortly thereafter.110 
A complaint for medical negligence was filed. In an effort “to 
establish the requisite standard of care, or that it was breached,”111 
the plaintiff produced an affidavit of a chiropractor.112 The trial court 
found that the chiropractor was “not qualified to testify regarding the 
standard of care rendered in this case by board certified physicians 
specializing in internal medicine and pulmonary disease . . . .”113 The 
court of appeals agreed, noting “that chiropractors are generally not 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Jason W. Busse et al., Attitudes Toward Chiropractic—A Survey of North American Orthopedic 
Surgeons, 34 SPINE 2818, 2822 (2009). 
 105. See Lawrence H. Wyatt et al., The Necessary Future of Chiropractic Education: A North 
American Perspective, 13 CHIROPRACTIC & OSTEOPATHY 10 (2005). 
 106. Stackhouse v. Scanlon, 576 N.E.2d 635, 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
 107. A pulmonary embolism “is a blood clot that blocks the blood vessels supplying the lungs.” Jill 
M. Merrigan et al., Pulmonary Embolism, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 504, 504 (2013). 
 108. Stackhouse, 576 N.E.2d at 636–37; see also Robert L. Gauer, Early Recognition and 
Management of Sepsis in Adults: The First Six Hours, 88 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 44, 44 (2013). 
 109. Stackhouse, 576 N.E.2d at 637. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/4
2019] NON-PHYSICIAN VS. PHYSICIAN 697 
qualified to serve as experts in cases involving physicians. They do 
not have the same education, training[,] or experience, all of which 
are generally necessary to render an opinion of benefit to a jury.”114 
Due to the absence of the required expert testimony, the court 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants.115 
In 1971, a student-authored law review article stated: 
“Chiropractors have been held competent to testify as expert 
witnesses in malpractice suits against medical doctors.”116 The author 
referred to two state supreme court cases for this proposition.117 
These cases will be examined to determine if the author’s 
pronouncement suggests that chiropractors may testify to the 
standard of care applicable to a medical doctor, and to deviation from 
the standard of care. 
In Ness v. Yeomans, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a 
jury verdict against a physician for the alleged improper “setting and 
treatment of a broken arm.”118 At trial, a chiropractor who treated the 
plaintiff testified as to x-rays of the plaintiff’s arm, “some of which 
were taken by this witness.”119 He testified about his education, 
training, and experience with x-rays.120 In approving this testimony, 
the court significantly noted: 
A chiropractor may testify as to matters in which he is 
qualified to speak so long as he is not attempting to testify 
in regard to a school of treatment separate and distinct from 
his. He could not testify as to the methods and practices of 
this other school without showing his qualifications 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. at 639. 
 115. Stackhouse, 576 N.E.2d at 639. 
 116. Ronald J. Zele, Note, Chiropractors as Expert Medical Witnesses, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 53, 60 
(1971). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Ness v. Yeomans, 234 N.W. 75, 75 (N.D. 1931) 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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therefor. He was not so testifying.121 
The chiropractic witness, therefore, was permitted to testify about 
taking and interpreting x-rays.122 He did not provide standard of care 
testimony.123 In fact, the plaintiff did not introduce any expert 
testimony at trial, “being content to depend upon the cross-
examination of the expert witnesses furnished by the defendant[] and 
the examination of the [x]-ray pictures taken.”124 As the plaintiff 
failed to produce any standard of care or deviation from the standard 
of care testimony against the defendant-surgeon, the court reversed 
the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial and 
remanded the case for a new trial.125 
Another point should be addressed regarding Ness.126 As a treating 
chiropractor, it may well have been appropriate to allow this witness 
to testify about x-rays, particularly those which he took and 
interpreted in his treatment of the plaintiff. It is, however, 
problematic if the jury is able to compare those x-rays and 
interpretations to radiological studies interpreted by radiologists 
(physicians) and draw inferences as to the quality of care rendered by 
physicians. Medical literature reveals that chiropractic radiology 
facilities and image quality do not compare favorably with those of 
physician-radiologists.127 Chiropractors are not radiologists128 and 
should not be permitted to provide standard of care testimony against 
a physician-radiologist (or other medically trained physician). 
The other reported opinion referred to in the student law review 
article is Dorr, Gray & Johnston v. Headstream, in which the 
Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed a medical negligence verdict 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 77. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Ness, 234 N.W. at 77. 
 125. Id. at 78. 
 126. Id. at 77. 
 127. David C. Levin, Vijay M. Rao & William W. Orrison, Turf Wars in Radiology: The Quality of 
Imaging Facilities Operated by Nonradiologist Physicians and of the Images They Produce, 1 J. AM. C. 
RADIOLOGY 649, 650 (2004). 
 128. Zele, supra note 116, at 61. 
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against “partners engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery”129 
for allegedly “burning [the plaintiff’s] left arm with an [x]-ray while 
treating a small place thereon diagnosed by them as eczema.”130 The 
court allowed chiropractor testimony about “to testify as to the 
amount of dosage it would take to burn the human body and whether 
the dosage was properly or whether negligently administered.”131 The 
court also permitted the chiropractor to testify “that certain alleged 
facts constituted negligence on the part of appellants.”132 
It is quite difficult to understand the court’s approval of standard 
of care testimony by a chiropractor against a medical doctor. 
Literature more than suggests serious educational shortcomings with 
chiropractic schools at the time of the Dorr opinion.133 In 
comparison, following the Flexner Report of 1910, American 
medical schools became high quality institutions, focusing on basic 
sciences and clinical training.134 It would seem that the practices of 
chiropractors and medical doctors were not easily confused in the late 
1920’s. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s opinion appears to be 
wrong.135 
VI.   The Neuroscientist 
The Society for Neuroscience states that “[n]euroscientists 
specialize in the study of the brain and the nervous system.”136 At 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Dorr, Gray & Johnston v. Headstream, 295 S.W. 16, 16 (Ark. 1927). 
 130. Id. at 17. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 18. 
 133. Joseph C. Keating, Carl S. Cleveland & Michael Menke, CHIROPRACTIC HISTORY: A PRIMER 14 
(2004); Alana Ferguson & Glenda Wiese, How Many Chiropractic Schools? An Analysis of Institutions 
That Offered the D.C. Degree, 8 CHIROPRACTIC HIST. 27, 28 (1988). 
 134. See Molly Cooke et al., American Medical Education 100 Years After the Flexner Report, 355 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1339, 1339–40 (2006); Thomas P. Duffy, The Flexner Report—100 Years Later, 84 
YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 269, 269 (2011). 
 135. In a completely unrelated but interesting matter, see Laura Braden Foster, Nobles v. Casebier 
and Judicial Comments on the Evidence in Arkansas, 51 ARK. L. REV. 801, 801 (1998) (discussing a 
“trial judge’s facetious remarks about chiropractors during the reading of a chiropractor’s 
deposition . . .”). 
 136. About Neuroscience, SOC’Y FOR NEUROSCIENCE, 
https://neuronline.sfn.org/Home/SfN/About/About-Neuroscience [https://perma.cc/86T2-6H5C] (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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least one court has defined neuroscience has been defined by a court 
as “a multidisciplinary study of how the brain works: its anatomy, its 
living processes, its physiology, its chemistry[,] and its structure.”137 
Neuroscience training typically results in a candidate earning a 
Ph.D.138 Certainly, a neuroscientist who is not also a medical doctor 
cannot treat patients. Should courts permit neuroscientists to testify 
as to the standard of care applicable to a physician in medical 
negligence litigation? 
The Texas Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Ponder v. 
Texarkana Memorial Hospital.139 Here, a newborn suffered a 
neurological injury.140 At trial, the court prohibited plaintiffs’ 
neuroscience expert, who had excellent academic, research, and 
teaching qualifications, from providing standard of care testimony.141 
On appeal, the court stated that because the neuroscience expert 
was “not a medical doctor[] and has never treated patients, we do not 
find that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing him from 
answering questions concerning the standard of care.”142 The court 
did, however, note that “[n]on-physicians may qualify as medical 
experts by virtue of special experience”143 and that the 
neuroscientist’s “experience clearly qualified him to testify about 
brain function and the causes of damage to the brain.”144 Therefore, 
the trial court abused its discretion by precluding this witness from 
testifying as to causation.145 
The Ponder opinion clearly detailed the qualifications and 
experience of the neuroscience expert.146 Because this expert lacked 
the contextual experience of a medical doctor, the court was correct 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Ponder v. Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., 840 S.W.2d 476, 477 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), superseded by 
statute, Medical Liability Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.403(a) (West 2011). 
 138. See Huda Akil et al., Neuroscience Training for the 21st Century, 90 NEURON 917, 917 (2016). 
 139. Ponder, 840 S.W.2d at 478. 
 140. Id. at 477. 
 141. Id. at 477–78. The court also excluded causation testimony. Id. 
 142. Id. at 478. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Ponder, 840 S.W.2d at 478. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 477–78. 
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in confirming that the expert could not provide standard of care 
testimony. He was, however, “clearly qualified . . . to testify about 
brain function and the causes of damage to the brain.”147 That 
testimony implicated causation, not the standard of care applicable to 
the defendant-physician. 
VII.   The Physiologist 
“Physiology is the study of normal function within living 
creatures. It is a sub-section of biology, covering a range of topics 
that include organs, anatomy, cells, biological compounds, and how 
they all interact to make life possible.”148 “Physiology teaches that all 
biological phenomena are connected.”149 More than thirty-five years 
ago, the Washington Supreme Court considered cross-disciplinary 
expert testimony of a non-physician physiologist, including language 
in its opinion that predicted an expansive and flexible approach to the 
determination of expert-witness qualifications.150  
In Harris v. Robert C. Groth M.D., Inc.,151 the Washington 
Supreme Court considered a medical negligence claim arising from 
the plaintiff’s eye disease. At trial, the plaintiff “offered additional 
testimony . . . [by] a physiologist not licensed to practice medicine, 
but the trial court ruled that he was not qualified to give such 
testimony.”152 The Washington Supreme Court held that the 
limitation placed on the physiologist’s trial testimony was not “a 
manifest abuse of discretion”153 but stated: 
The standard of care against which a health care provider’s 
conduct is to be measured is that of a reasonably prudent 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. at 478. 
 148. Tim Newman, A Brief Introduction to Physiology, MED. NEWS TODAY (Oct. 13, 2017), 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/248791.php [https://perma.cc/D89B-PCDA]. 
 149. Martin E. Feder, Aims of Undergraduate Physiology Education: A View from the University of 
Chicago, 29 ADVANCES PHYSIOLOGY EDUC. 3, 9 (2005). 
 150. Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., 663 P.2d 113, 114 (Wash. 1983). 
 151. Id. at 114. 
 152. Id. at 115. 
 153. Id. at 120. 
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practitioner possessing the degree of skill, care, and 
learning possessed by other members of the same 
profession in the state of Washington. . . . [E]xpert 
testimony will be necessary to show whether or not a 
particular practice is reasonably prudent. . . . This expert 
testimony may be provided by non[-]physicians, however, 
if the trial court finds them qualified.154  
Here, the Washington Supreme Court clearly approved the trial 
court’s review of a non-physician’s qualifications to provide standard 
of care testimony against a physician. In the court’s view, this 
approach departed from the norm, stating, “[Although] most courts 
have imposed per se limitations on the testimony of otherwise 
qualified non[-]physicians, such limitations are not in accord with the 
modern trend in the law of evidence generally. That trend is away 
from reliance on formal titles or degrees.”155 
This supposed “trend” is debatable. It disregards the problem with 
non-physician experts discussed thus far in this article; they do not 
have the physician experience of caring for patients and decision-
making in that context. This issue, however, cannot be ignored. 
Ultimately, this paper address non-physician healthcare providers 
who are intimately involved in patient care156 and whether those non-
physicians should be entitled to opine on the medical standard of 
care. 
VIII.   The Pharmacist 
It has been aptly noted that: 
[o]ver the past four decades, the role of the pharmacist has 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Id. (emphasis added). 
 155. Id. at 119 (citation omitted). 
 156. See generally Nathan A. Boucher, Marvin A. McMillen & James S. Gould, Agents for Change: 
Nonphysician Medical Providers and Health Care Quality, 19 PERMANENTE J. 90 (2015); Brian Dulisse 
& Jerry Cromwell, No Harm Found When Nurse Anesthetists Work Without Supervision by Physicians, 
29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1469 (2010). 
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evolved from an individual who was primarily responsible 
for safely and accurately distributing a medication product 
to a patient[] to an individual who works side-by-side with 
physicians, nurses, and other healthcare professionals in 
sophisticated, highly specialized practice settings to assure 
appropriate medication therapy management.157  
In fact, “pharmacists’ scope of practice includes the provision of 
direct patient care services in primary care settings.”158 The pharm-
acists involved in direct patient care receive specialty training and are 
known as clinical pharmacists.159 Perhaps coincidental or perhaps 
related to a more recent recognition of the pharmacist as a health care 
professional, there is an interesting array of judicial decisions relating 
to standard of medical care testimony by pharmacist-experts.160 
The most interesting decision pronouncing the strict exclusion of a 
pharmacist’s medical standard of care testimony is Young v. Key 
Pharmaceuticals.161 Here, the Washington Supreme Court considered 
a medical negligence claim that alleged that the defendants 
negligently prescribed asthma medication162 and negligently 
monitored blood medication levels.163 The plaintiff intended to utilize 
a pharmacist as a standard of care expert against the defendant-
physicians.164 The state supreme court succinctly framed the issue as 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Michael L. Adams & Robert A. Blouin, The Role of the Pharmacist in Health Care: Expanding 
and Evolving, 78 N.C. MED. J. 165, 165–66 (2017). 
 158. Mollie Ashe Scott, Jeffrey E. Heck & Courtenay Gilmore Wilson, The Integral Role of the 
Clinical Pharmacist Practitioner in Primary Care, 78 N.C. MED. J. 181, 181 (2017). 
 159. See Judith Jacobi, Clinical Pharmacists: Practitioners Who Are Essential Members of Your 
Clinical Care Team, 27 REVISTA MÉDICA CLÍNICA LAS CONDES 571, 571 (2016); About Clinical 
Pharmacists, AM. C. CLINICAL PHARMACY, https://www.accp.com/about/clinicalpharmacists.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/U7ZL-2MQR] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 160. See generally Romero v. Hanisch, No. 08-5040-JLV, 2010 WL 5020657 (D.S.D. Dec. 3, 2010); 
Bell v. Hart, 516 So. 2d 562 (Ala. 1987); Smith v. Harris, 670 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Shannon 
v. Fusco, 89 A.3d 1156 (Md. 2014); Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 770 P.2d 182 (Wash. 1989). 
 161. Young, 770 P.2d at 184. 
 162. Id. at 185. The medication was theophylline, popularly used to treat asthma for many years. See 
Miles Weinberger & Leslie Hendeles, Theophylline in Asthma, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1380 
(1996). 
 163. Young, 770 P.2d at 185. 
 164. Id. 
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follows: “Is a pharmacist competent to testify to whether [the 
plaintiff’s] physicians breached their standard of care when that 
pharmacist’s sole connection to this case is that she reviewed [the 
plaintiff’s] medical records?”165 Despite the fact that Young followed 
the same court’s opinion in Harris six years later, which apparently 
created an opportunity for cross-disciplinary standard of care 
testimony, the Young court pronounced: “This court has never 
accepted, however, a rule that would allow a non[-]physician to 
testify as an expert regarding the proper standard of care for a 
physician practicing a medical specialty. Such a rule would severely 
degrade administration of justice in medical malpractice actions.”166 
Additionally, the court stated that “we have found no cases in which 
a non[-]physician is found competent to testify on a physician’s 
technical medical standard of care in a medical malpractice case.”167 
Although the court was willing to acknowledge a pharmacist’s 
training and expertise regarding medications, it highlighted that a 
pharmacist lacked the specific training and experience of a physician, 
stating, “With all due respect to the pharmaceutical profession, 
pharmacists are not doctors and are not licensed to prescribe 
medication because they lack the physician’s rigorous training in 
diagnosis and treatment.”168 Essentially, then, the Young opinion 
reflects a valid strict belief that pharmacists are not physicians and, 
therefore, cannot opine on the standard of care applicable to a 
physician.169 
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reached a similar conclusion in 
Smith v. Harris;170 however, the court’s opinion was largely informed 
by a Georgia statute governing the opinions of expert witnesses in 
medical negligence litigation.171 Here, the plaintiff’s pharmacist 
expert testified that the defendant-physician “had violated the 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. at 188. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 189. 
 168. Id. at 190. 
 169. Young, 770 P.2d at 190. 
 170. Smith v. Harris, 670 S.E.2d 136, 140 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
 171. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)(2) (2013); Smith, 670 S.E.2d at 140. 
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applicable standard of care when he prescribed . . . Gentamicin,172 
when he failed to recognize . . . [plaintiff’s] developing Gentamicin 
toxicity, and when he failed to reevaluate her treatment . . . .”173 The 
aforementioned statute requires an expert witness to have “had actual 
professional knowledge and experience in the area of practice or 
specialty in which the opinion is to be given . . . ”174 and to be “a 
member of the same profession.”175 Georgia statutory law defined 
pharmacists as a profession different from that of a medical doctor.176 
Therefore, the plaintiff’s pharmacist expert should not have been 
permitted to testify that a defendant-physician violated a medical 
standard of care.177 
The Supreme Court of Alabama, based in part on the state’s 
Medical Liability Act,178 affirmed a trial court’s exclusion of medical 
standard of care testimony by a pharmacist against a physician in Bell 
v. Hart.179 Here, the plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action in 
connection with the defendant-physician’s prescription of Elavil, an 
antidepressant.180 The plaintiffs’ pharmacist expert, a well-qualified 
clinical pharmacist, gave deposition testimony, opining that the 
defendant-physician “deviated from the accepted standard of care in 
the medical community for the prescription, dosage, and 
administration of the drug Elavil . . . .”181 The trial court excluded 
this testimony based on lack of competency.182 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Gentamicin is an antibiotic that carries a risk of nephrotoxicity. See Jose M. Lopez-Novoa, et al., 
New Insights into the Mechanism of Aminoglycoside Nephrotoxicity: An Integrative Point of View, 79 
KIDNEY INT’L 33, 33 (2011). 
 173. Smith, 670 S.E.2d at 139. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 140. 
 177. Id. 
 178. ALA. CODE § 6-5-480 (2018). 
 179. Bell v. Hart, 516 So. 2d 562, 570 (Ala. 1987). 
 180. See J. Inglis et al., A Psychiatric and Psychological Study of Amitriptyline (Elavil) as an 
Antidepressant, 88 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 797, 802 (1963). 
 181. Bell, 516 So. 2d at 565. 
 182. Id. It should also be noted that witness competency is determined by the trial court, as a matter of 
law. See Scott Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IOWA L. REV. 482, 495 (1939). 
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The supreme court agreed that the pharmacist expert was not 
competent to opine “on the standard of care of physicians in 
prescribing the drug Elavil.”183 By stating that the standard of care in 
medicine “must be established by medical testimony,”184 the court 
concluded that medical testimony must be given by physicians.185 
Furthermore, the court stated that it could not “permit a 
non[-]physician, who cannot legally prescribe a drug, to testify 
concerning the standard of care that should be exercised in the 
prescription of the drug.”186 Thus, Bell presumably represents a 
policy of strict exclusion of cross-disciplinary standard of care 
testimony by pharmacists. 
More recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
clinical pharmacist could not provide standard of care testimony 
against a physician in an informed consent case, but could opine as to 
the “material risks of the administration of [a drug] . . . .”187 In 
Shannon v. Fusco, Maryland’s highest court considered an informed 
consent claim against a physician “in which it was alleged that a 
physician failed to obtain informed consent for the administration of 
radiation therapy and a drug, Amifostine . . . .”188 The trial court 
barred this testimony,189 but the state’s highest court 
“reversed . . . because he had substantial experience studying and 
advising patients regarding oncology medications, including 
Amifostine, and therefore, should have been permitted to testify.”190 
In Maryland, the doctrine of informed consent requires a physician 
to disclose material information that “a physician knows or ought to 
know would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient’s 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Bell, 516 So. 2d at 566. 
 184. Id. at 569 (citing Rodriguez v. Jackson, 574 P.2d 481, 485 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)). 
 185. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States also noted that medical testimony can be provided by 
“properly introduced medical treatises.” Id. at 570. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Shannon v. Fusco, 89 A.3d 1156, 1175 (Md. 2014). 
 188. Id. at 1159; see also John R. Kouvaris et al., Amifostine: The First Selective-Target and Broad-
Spectrum Radioprotector, 12 ONCOLOGIST 738, 738 (2007) (explaining that “Amifostine has been 
shown to specifically protect normal tissues from damage caused by radiation and chemotherapy”). 
 189. Shannon, 89 A.3d at 1160. 
 190. Id. (citing Fusco v. Shannon, 63 A.3d 145, 162 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013)). 
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position in deciding whether or not to submit to a particular medical 
treatment or procedure.” This includes “the nature of the ailment, the 
nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success of the 
contemplated therapy and its alternatives, and the risk of unfortunate 
consequences associated with such treatment.”191 Of course, these 
disclosure requirements establish a standard of care applicable to the 
physician seeking a patient’s informed consent. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland confirmed that expert 
testimony was required for proof in an informed consent claim192 and 
stated that the plaintiff’s pharmacist-expert “may have been qualified 
to testify about the likelihood and severity of risks caused by the 
administration of Amifostine.”193 The court stated that the pharmacy 
expert “was never offered as an expert to testify about the types of 
information [the defendant-physician] had a duty to disclose . . . .”194 
yet he “had the requisite expertise to testify about the material risks 
of the administration of Amifostine.”195 This supposed distinction is 
troubling and may be a distinction without a difference. If the 
pharmacist-expert is permitted to testify about material risks of drug 
administration, the expert is, arguably, testifying to the medical 
standard of care, which requires disclosure of “material information” 
significant to a patient. Therefore, this evidence could contribute to a 
jury determination of a standard of care violation and contradict the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland’s opinion that the pharmacist expert 
was not qualified to opine on the standard of care.196 
The most liberal position on the propriety of a pharmacist’s 
standard of care testimony against a defendant-physician has been 
taken by the United States District Court in South Dakota.197 In 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Shannon, 89 A.3d at 1169–70 (citing Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Md. 1977)). 
 192. Id. at 1172. 
 193. Id. at 1174. 
 194. Id. at 1175. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See generally Romero v. Hanisch, No. CIV.08–504–JLV, 2010 WL 5020657 (D.S.D. Dec. 3, 
2010). 
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Romero v. Hanisch198 the district court considered a defense motion 
in a medical negligence claim arising from the defendant-physician’s 
treatment of plaintiff’s hyperlipidemia (high cholesterol).199 The 
plaintiff’s sole disclosed expert was “a licensed pharmacist and 
clinical toxicologist”200 who was expected to testify to the standard of 
care applicable to a physician regarding the use of medications for 
the treatment of high cholesterol, breach of that standard of care, and 
causation.201 The defendant-physician moved for summary judgment 
due to the alleged lack of competent expert testimony as to the 
standard of care.202 
Unquestionably, the plaintiff’s pharmacist expert was well 
qualified as a clinical pharmacist.203 He had earned an undergraduate 
degree in pharmacy and a doctorate in clinical pharmacy.204 He also 
had extensive subsequent training and teaching experience regarding 
medication safety, including the medications that the defendant-
physician prescribed to the plaintiff, and had previously provided 
medical standard of care testimony in litigation.205 The district court 
observed that “[t]he only professional license [he] holds is in 
pharmacy[;] he is not licensed to make a medical diagnosis and does 
not hold medical staff privileges at any hospital.”206 Additionally, the 
district court noted that plaintiff’s pharmacist expert “[was] not 
permitted to prescribe medications for patients.”207 Of course these 
facts suggest that, despite the pharmacist’s wealth of knowledge, he 
does not have the experience identical to a physician who can 
diagnose and treat patients with high cholesterol. 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Judith M. E. Walsh & Michael Pignone, Drug Treatment of Hyperlipidemia in Women, 291 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2243, 2243 (2004). 
 200. Romero, 2010 WL 5020657, at *2. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at *3. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *5. 
 206. Romero, 2010 WL 5020657, at *5. 
 207. Id. 
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The district court, in referring to South Dakota law, held that the 
plaintiff’s pharmacy expert was a medical expert208 and that he was 
“competent to testify as to a physician’s standard of care in 
monitoring the safe and effective use of statin drugs.”209 Therefore, 
Romero represents an aggressive approach to cross-disciplinary 
expert testimony, implicating the issue of whether an expert’s lack of 
physician training and the physician-patient experience should 
disqualify the non-physician expert from opining on the medical 
standard of care. 
IX.   The Nurse Anesthetist 
A nurse anesthetist is a highly trained nurse who administers 
surgical anesthesia and, apparently, does so quite well.210 Nurse 
anesthetists occupy a distinct role in the nursing profession, as there 
are no “clear demarcations distinguishing which tasks are appropriate 
for physicians [anesthesiologists] versus nurses.”211 Nurse 
anesthetists are nurses with specialty training212—they do not possess 
medical degrees and are not physicians.213 The American Association 
of Nurse Anesthetists reports that there are 52,000 nurse anesthetists 
“who safely administer approximately 45 million anesthetics to 
patients each year in the United States . . . .”214  
Courts have been impressed with the experience of nurse 
anesthetists.215 As such, they have approved medical standard of care 
testimony by nurse anesthetist experts against 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. at *7. 
 209. Id. at *8. 
 210. See Dulisse & Cromwell, supra note 156, at 1469. 
 211. Cassandra L. Taylor, Attitudes Toward Physician-Nurse Collaboration in Anesthesia, 77 AM. 
ASS’N. NURSE ANESTHETISTS J. 343, 343 (2009). 
 212. Education of Nurse Anesthetists in the United States—At a Glance, AM. ASS’N. NURSE 
ANESTHETISTS (last updated Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.aana.com/membership/become-a-
crna/education-of-nurse-anesthetists-in-the-u.s [https://perma.cc/8SQ5-XR3W]. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists Fact Sheet, AM. ASS’N. NURSE ANESTHETISTS (last 
updated Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.aana.com/membership/become-a-crna/crna-fact-sheet 
[https://perma.cc/EP3H-LNHY]. It should also be noted that nurse anesthetists administer anesthesia 
outside of the hospital operating room. Id. 
 215. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 889 (Iowa 1996). 
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defendant-physicians.216 In Carolan v. Hill, the Iowa Supreme Court, 
referring to a state statute requiring “medical qualifications” of expert 
witnesses,217 held that licensure was not a requirement for the 
admission of expert testimony218 and a nurse anesthetist’s testimony 
as to the medical standard of care applicable to a physician was 
improperly excluded by the trial court.219 Here, the plaintiff’s nurse 
anesthetist expert, “[i]n his twenty-seven years of practice . . . [had] 
delivered anesthesia to approximately 17,000 patients.”220  
Moreover, in Harris v. Miller, a medical negligence action against 
an orthopedic surgeon assisted by a nurse anesthetist, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina held that plaintiff’s nurse anesthetist expert 
should have been permitted to testify that the defendant-orthopedic 
surgeon was negligent in his supervision of the nurse anesthetist. The 
nurse anesthetist expert had “fifteen years of practice as a nurse 
anesthetist . . . [and] had participated in thousands of operations.”221 
The state supreme court stated that “having worked so frequently 
with surgeons, she was as knowledgeable as they about the way 
surgeons ordinarily supervise nurse anesthetists.”222  
More than forty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court sent 
mixed signals regarding the propriety of medical standard of care 
testimony by a nurse anesthetist.223 In Cornfeldt v. Tongen, the state 
supreme court considered a medical negligence claim involving 
surgical procedures for a perforated ulcer and removal of “suspicious 
cells.”224 Subsequently, the patient suffered liver damage and died 
from hepatitis.225 A medical negligence action followed, stating 
claims against multiple defendants.226 As to the defendant-
                                                                                                                 
 216. Id.; Harris v. Miller, 438 S.E.2d 731, 742 (N.C. 1994). 
 217. IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.139 (West 2018). 
 218. Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 888. 
 219. Id. at 889. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Harris, 438 S.E.2d at 742. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 691 (Minn. 1977). 
 224. Id. at 690. 
 225. Id. at 691. 
 226. Id. 
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anesthesiologist, the plaintiff alleged that he “was negligent in his 
selection of Fluothane as one of the anesthetics.”227 At trial, the trial 
court determined that “the chief nurse anesthetist . . . lacked the 
qualifications to render . . . expert medical opinions . . . .”228 
Specifically, the opinions were “relative to the use of anesthesia” 
during surgery.229 The trial court excluded the testimony because the 
nurse anesthetist “was not licensed to practice medicine in . . . [any] 
state.”230 
The court disagreed with the trial court’s basis for disqualifying 
the nurse anesthetist from testifying. The court held that: 
Thus, [the nurse anesthetist] was not disqualified from 
testifying solely because he was not a licensed physician or 
because he did not graduate from medical school and had 
received only the training of a registered nurse anesthetist. 
If [he] otherwise had sufficient scientific and practical 
experience about the matter to which he would have 
testified, he would have been a competent expert witness. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in excluding [his] testimony 
on that basis.231  
Clearly, this pronouncement suggests that a nurse-anesthetist 
expert is able to testify about the use of an anesthetic at surgery, 
implicating the standard of care applicable to an anesthesiologist. 
The court’s next statement is curious. It stated: “Plaintiff, however, 
intended to ask [the nurse anesthetist expert] his opinion as to 
whether the anesthetic administered to [the patient] was appropriate 
in the circumstances. The procedure [the nurse anesthetist] would 
have followed is immaterial to the issue of whether defendant’s 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Id.; see also R. Bryce-Smith & H. D. O’Brien, Fluothane: A Non-Explosive Volatile Anesthetic 
Agent, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 969, 972 (1956); Thomas K. Burnap, Stephen J. Galla & Leroy D. Vandam, 
Anesthetic, Circulatory And Respiratory Effects of Fluothane, 19 ANESTHESIOLOGY 307, 307 (1958). 
 228. Cornfeldt, 262 N.W.2d at 691. 
 229. Id. at 696–97. 
 230. Id. at 697. 
 231. Id. 
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actions conformed to accepted medical practice.”232 It seems that the 
court has confused two concepts. First, a standard of care expert 
witness is always able to give opinion testimony, and the opinions 
given are those of the expert.233 It is true, however, that the personal 
preference of an expert—how the expert would have treated the 
patient—is not standard of care testimony and may be excluded.234 It 
is simply unclear if the court’s opinion in Cornfeldt recognizes that a 
nurse anesthetist expert witness may testify that an anesthesiologist 
deviated from the applicable standard of care. 
Despite the Cornfeldt uncertainty, courts may be persuaded to 
permit nurse anesthetists to testify as standard of care experts against 
anesthesiologists. If the roles of the nurse anesthetist and 
anesthesiologist are overlapping, and perhaps identical, a well-trained 
and experienced nurse anesthetist may be familiar with the medical 
standard of care, despite the lack of medical school training. 
X.   The Pharmacologist/Toxicologist 
It has been stated that “pharmacology is the study of drug 
action,”235 and “the essence of pharmacology [is] trying to 
understand how to make drugs precisely effective and safe and also 
establish how they work.”236 “[C]linical pharmacology concentrates 
on two elementary questions: What do drugs do to the body? And 
what does the body do to drugs?”237 
The American Chemical Society (ACS) defines toxicology as 
follows: “Toxicologists study the safety and biological effects of 
drugs, chemicals, agents, and other substances on living organisms. 
They develop methods to determine harmful effects, the dosages that 
cause those effects, and safe exposure limits.”238 The ACS also states 
                                                                                                                 
 232. Id. (emphasis added). 
 233. Id. at 689–706. 
 234. See Ayala v. Murad, 855 N.E.2d 261, 272 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 235. Patrick Vallance & Trevor G. Smart, The Future of Pharmacology, 147 BRIT. J. 
PHARMACOLOGY S304, S305 (2006). 
 236. Id. at S307. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Toxicology, AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y, https://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/careers/college-to-
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that “[t]oxicology brings together a wide variety of fields, including 
chemistry, biology, pharmacology, human and animal medicine, and 
environmental science, to help inform policies and regulations to 
protect both human health and the environment.”239 
Therefore, pharmacology and toxicology are related disciplines. 
Unless a pharmacologist or toxicologist has earned a medical degree, 
he is not a physician.240 Courts are not of one mind on the issue of 
whether a pharmacologist/toxicologist expert may testify as to the 
standard of care applicable to a physician.241 In Thompson v. Carter, 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi permitted a 
pharmacologist/toxicologist expert to testify that an urologist violated 
the applicable standard of care as to the administration of an 
antibiotic that allegedly caused Stevens-Johnson Syndrome.242 The 
trial court had excluded the testimony.243  
In Thompson, the plaintiff’s pharmacology/toxicology expert had 
earned a master’s degree in these disciplines and had significant 
practice and teaching experience.244 He was familiar with the 
antibiotic at issue as well as the plaintiff’s illness.245 The court noted 
that the possession of a medical degree is not necessary for an expert 
to testify to the medical standard of care.246 The key ingredient is 
medical knowledge.247 The court did not note that the expert was not 
an urologist, did not treat patients with urological diseases, and did 
not have the clinical experience and context of a trained physician.248 
                                                                                                                 
career/chemistry-careers/toxicology.html [https://perma.cc/QL2T-ARHG] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See supra Part XI. 
 242. Thompson v. Carter, 518 So. 2d 609, 614 (Miss. 1987). Stevens-Johnson Syndrome is a “severe 
cutaneous adverse reaction . . . affecting skin and mucous membranes.” Maja Mockenhaupt, The 
Current Understanding of Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis, 7 EXPERT REV. 
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 803, 804 (2011); see also Thomas Harr & Lars E. French, Toxic Epidermal 
Necrolysis and Stevens-Johnson Syndrome, 5 ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES 39, 39 (2010). 
 243. Thompson, 518 So. 2d at 610. 
 244. Id. at 613. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 614. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See generally id. 
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A compelling dissent urged that the court confused the standard of 
care applicable to a physician with causation and that the plaintiff 
simply did not produce any standard of care evidence.249 It is 
elementary that a properly prescribed and administered medication 
which causes complications will not support a verdict against a 
physician for medical negligence.250 
In Garvey v. O’Donoghue, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals held that the plaintiffs’ expert pharmacologist should have 
been permitted to testify “about the proper or excessive dosage of 
Tobramycin251 and whether or not Tobramycin was properly 
prescribed to [the plaintiff].”252 The expert was a retired dean of a 
pharmacy college where he taught and “engaged in clinical research 
on aminoglycosides, the group of drugs to which Tobramycin 
belongs.”253 Without citation to authority, the court of appeals 
pronounced: 
It seems clear, then, that to the extent physicians do rely on 
a body of pharmacological information, the expertise of a 
pharmacologist is virtually indistinguishable from that of 
the physician. [Because] physicians rely upon information 
that originates with or is provided by the practitioners in 
another field, here pharmacologists, this reliance opens the 
door for these non[-]physicians to testify as to that body of 
information. In effect, where a physician “borrows” a 
standard of care from the research and work of other 
professionals, members of that profession may testify about 
it.254 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Thompson, 518 So. 2d at 617. 
 250. Id. at 616. 
 251. Tobramycin is an antibiotic. See Matthew E. Levison et al., In Vitro Evaluation of Tobramycin, a 
New Aminoglycoside Antibiotic, 1 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 381, 381 (1972). 
 252. Garvey v. O’Donoghue, 530 A.2d 1141, 1146 (D.C. 1987). 
 253. Id. at 1144. 
 254. Id. at 1147. 
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As in Thompson v. Carter, the court of appeals was, apparently, 
unconcerned that the pharmacology expert lacked patient-care 
experience. It did not provide an effective explanation for the ability 
of a pharmacologist to know how a reasonably well-qualified 
physician should act under the circumstances.255  
Similarly, in Pratt v. Stein, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
held that the plaintiff’s expert pharmacologist, a professor of 
pharmacology, was qualified to opine on the medical standard of care 
applicable to the administration of neomycin, an antibiotic.256 Here, 
the court stated: 
The primary focus of his testimony was that neomycin was 
known to be a highly toxic antibiotic, that there were other, 
safer drugs that could have been used . . . , and that the 
dosage and manner in which neomycin was administered 
was below the standard of reasonable medical care. Since 
pharmacology is the study of various medications, their 
origin, nature, properties, and effects upon living 
organisms, . . . it would appear that [he] was eminently 
qualified to render an opinion on this subject.257  
Again, the court ignored the fact that the pharmacology expert was 
not a physician and lacked the experience of prescribing antibiotics 
while treating a patient.258 
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the opposite conclusion. 
In Rodriguez v. Jackson, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a 
Ph.D. pharmacologist could not opine on the medical standard of care 
and “[was] not competent to give an opinion as to whether the 
doctors were negligent” “in their diagnosis, treatment[,] and 
                                                                                                                 
 255. Garvey, 530 A.2d at 1147. 
 256. Pratt v. Stein, 444 A.2d 674, 706 (Pa. 1982), superseded by statute, Medical Care Availability 
and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.512 (2018). For more scientific 
information regarding neomycin, see generally Selman A. Waksman et al., Neomycin-Production and 
Antibiotic Properties, 28 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 934 (1949). 
 257. Pratt, 444 A.2d at 706. 
 258. Id. 
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administration of drugs.”259 In Friedel v. Osunkoya, a Delaware 
court, informed in part by state statutes, held that a plaintiff’s 
pharmacology expert who “neither practices medicine nor is entitled 
to prescribe [medication]”260 was disqualified from offering standard 
of care opinions against a defendant-physician. In so doing, the court 
appreciated that physicians and pharmacologists may have 
overlapping knowledge regarding “dosage issues and usage issues”261 
yet noted that although they are both medical professionals, “they are 
not in the same profession and do not receive the same training.262 
A New Jersey appellate court, in Cardinale v. Losman, held that a 
pharmacologist could not give standard of care opinions against a 
defendant-physician.263 Here, the court found that the pharmacologist 
lacked the necessary qualification to opine on the medical standard of 
care and that the pharmacologist’s lack of a medical license was not 
the basis of its decision.264 The same pharmacologist was the subject 
of a similar decision of a New York state appellate court in Jordan v. 
Glens Falls Hospital.265 The court noted that despite “an impressive 
curriculum vitae, he is not a medical doctor and hence his opinion as 
to the course of treatment [the] defendant should have undertaken 
was beyond his ‘professional and educational experience and cannot 
be considered “competent medical opinion” on [the] issue of [the] 
defendant’s negligence.’”266  
Finally, in Bissett v. Renna, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
agreed with a trial court that a pharmacologist was not “qualified to 
testify as an expert witness to the standard of care expected of an 
ophthalmologist in the defendant’s position.”267 The state supreme 
court’s opinion was informed by a state statute governing the burden 
                                                                                                                 
 259. Rodriguez v. Jackson, 574 P.2d 481, 484–85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). 
 260. Friedel v. Osunkoya, 994 A.2d 746, 762 (Del. Super. Ct. 2010). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Cardinale v. Losman, No. A-3996-05T1, 2008 WL 65494, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Jan. 
8, 2008). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Jordan v. Glens Falls Hosp., 261 A.D.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Bissett v. Renna, 710 A.2d 404, 407 (N.H. 1998). 
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of proof in medical negligence litigation268 and by the 
pharmacologist’s concession “that he did not consider himself 
qualified to testify to the standard of care of an ophthalmologist in 
the defendant’s position.”269 The court also emphasized that the 
pharmacologist “did not have a medical degree and had received no 
training in the medical fields of ophthalmology or hematology.”270 
Additionally, he had no relevant research experience, no experience 
treating patients with the disease at issue, and “had never 
encountered the disease prior to being retained as a consultant in this 
case.”271 
The courts prohibiting medical standard of care testimony by 
pharmacology experts are on the correct side of the issue. Despite 
having in-depth knowledge of medications, pharmacologists lack the 
clinical training and experience gained by physicians.272  
XI.   The Physician Assistant 
Having developed in the 1960s, the physician assistant profession 
was “a new health care provider model to work only with physician 
supervision and not as independent providers.”273 The typical 
physician assistant curriculum is a full-time program, just over two 
years in duration.274 There is a national certifying exam and a 
continuing medical education requirement.275 As of 2011, it was 
estimated that there were more than 70,000 physicians assistants in 
the United States.276 A state may legislate the qualifications of a 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Id. at 406. 
 269. Id. at 407. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Carolina J.P.W. Keijsers et al., A Comparison of Medical and Pharmacy Students’ Knowledge 
and Skills of Pharmacology and Pharmacotherapy, 78:4 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 781, 781 
(2014). 
 273. P. Eugene Jones, Physician Assistant Education in the United States, 82 ACAD. MED. 882, 882 
(2007). 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 884. 
 276. Roderick S. Hooker & Christine M. Everett, The Contributions of Physician Assistants in 
Primary Care Systems, 20(1) HEALTH & SOC. CARE COMMUNITY 20, 20 (2012). 
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physician assistant, including the requirement of physician 
supervision.277 
In Bradford v. Alexander, the plaintiff alleged that “she suffered 
chemically induced hepatitis as a result of [the defendant’s] negligent 
prescription of an antibiotic to which she was allergic.”278 The 
defendant moved for summary judgment, supported by his own 
affidavit stating that he complied with the applicable standard of 
care.279 The plaintiff attempted to resist the defendant’s motion with 
an affidavit of a physician assistant who claimed that she was 
familiar with the standard of care applicable to a physician, allegedly 
the same standard of care applicable to a “physician associate.”280 
The trial court granted summary judgment was granted for the 
defendant-physician.281 
On appeal, the court referred to a Texas statute governing expert 
witness testimony in a medical negligence case and held that a 
physician assistant did “not practice medicine as contemplated by the 
statute . . . .”282 The court also “found no authority in Texas to 
support the proposition that a physician assistant is qualified to testify 
about the standard of care a physician owes his or her patient.”283 
Further, the court stated that “[i]t would indeed lead to incongruity if 
we permitted a subordinate to testify as an expert concerning the 
standard of care to which we hold his or her supervisor, who has 
greater knowledge and training than the subordinate.”284 
The court’s reference to the physician assistant as a “subordinate” 
is unfortunate and unnecessary. The physician assistant’s education, 
training, and experience is not equivalent to that of a physician.285 It 
                                                                                                                 
 277. See Bradford v. Alexander, 886 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex. App. 1994). 
 278. Id. at 395. 
 279. Id. at 398. 
 280. Id. at 397. 
 281. Id. at 398. 
 282. Id. at 397. 
 283. Bradford, 886 S.W.2d at 397. 
 284. Id. 
 285. The Difference Between Physician and Physician Assistant Jobs, AUREUS MED. GROUP, 
https://www.aureusmedical.com/blog/2016/06/06/the-difference-between-physician-and-physician-
assistant-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/GG4K-MJM6] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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is, therefore, reasonable that a physician assistant cannot opine on the 
standard of care applicable to a physician. 
XII.   The Advanced Practice Registered Nurse/Nurse Practitioner 
The National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) 
defines the advanced practice registered nurse (APRN) as follows: 
Advanced practice registered nurses (APRN[s]) are a vital 
part of the health system of the United States. They are 
registered nurses educated at Masters or post Masters level 
and in a specific role and patient population. APRNs are 
prepared by education and certification to assess, diagnose, 
and manage patient problems, order tests, and prescribe 
medications.286  
Certified nurse practitioners (CNPs) are a subset of APRNs and are 
defined by the NCSBN as follows: 
CNPs are educated and practice at an advanced level to 
provide care, independently, in a range of setting[s] and in 
one of six described patient populations. CNPs are 
responsible and accountable for health promotion, disease 
prevention, health education and counseling as well as the 
diagnosis and management of acute and chronic diseases. 
They provide initial, ongoing[,] and comprehensive care to 
patients in family practice, pediatrics, internal medicine, 
geriatrics, and women’s health. CNPs are prepared to 
practice as primary care CNPs or acute care CNPs, which 
have separate national competencies and unique 
certifications.287  
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APRNs are licensed by the states and “[e]ach state independently 
determines the APRN legal scope of practice . . . .”288 It has been 
urged that a primary care physician shortage is responsible for the 
popularity of nurse practitioners.289 
Courts have not been inclined to allow nurse practitioner expert 
witnesses to opine on the medical standard of care.290 In Broehm v. 
Mayo Clinic Rochester, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
plaintiff’s nurse practitioner expert could not opine on the standard of 
care applicable to a physician providing “postoperative care 
following tracheal resection surgery,”291 because “[a]s the lower 
courts concluded, [she] has neither the training nor the practical 
experience necessary”292 to do so. She was, however, qualified to 
opine on the nursing standard of care.293  
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Tucker v. Talley, held that a 
“nurse practitioner cannot speak to an alleged missed case of 
cryptococcal meningitis294 on the part of a physician.”295 The court 
utilized an “overlapping expertise test”296 to assess the ability of the 
nurse practitioner to opine on the medical standard of care: 
“The general rule is that a member of a school of practice 
other than that to which the defendant belongs is not 
                                                                                                                 
 288. APRN CONSENSUS WORK GRP. & THE NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING APRN 
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 289. See Tine Hansen-Turton, Jamie Ware & Frank McClellan, Nurse Practitioners in Primary Care, 
82 TEMP. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2010). 
 290. Tucker v. Talley, 600 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Broehm v. Mayo Clinic Rochester, 
690 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Minn. 2005); Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 982 P.2d 565, 571 (Utah 1999). 
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 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Tucker, 600 S.E.2d at 782; see also Tihana Bicanic & Thomas S. Harrison, Cryptococcal 
Meningitis, 72 BRIT. MED. BULL. 99, 99 (2004) (explaining that “[c]ryptococcal meningitis is a common 
opportunistic infection . . .” occurring in immunocompromised “and in apparently immunocompetent 
individuals”); Vasilios Pyrgos et al., Epidemiology of Cryptococcal Meningitis in the US: 1997-2009, 8 
PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2013) (survivors of the disease can suffer “long term sequelae . . . such as focal 
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competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice case.” 
“The question presented here is whether there is sufficient 
proof of overlapping expertise to establish that [the] 
nurse . . . was competent to give the affidavit against . . . a 
medical doctor.” . . . The ordering of medical tests is not 
shown to be an overlapping function between a nurse 
practitioner and a medical doctor inasmuch as a nurse does 
not have independent authority to order diagnostic tests.297 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Boice Ex Rel. v. Marble, considered a 
medical negligence claim against a physiatrist by a patient who 
“fractured his neck and herniated a cervical disc in a recreational 
accident.”298 The patient was surgically treated and transferred to a 
rehabilitation facility, where he fell from a wheelchair and suffered 
additional injuries.299 The patient was re-hospitalized and then 
returned to the rehabilitation facility.300 Subsequently, the patient 
underwent additional surgery, but various deficits remained.301 
The patient sued the defendant-physiatrist, “claiming that [he] 
caused or contributed to the loss of use of his left wrist, hand, and 
fingers.”302 The plaintiff designated expert witnesses, including a 
physiatrist who later withdrew, leaving the plaintiff with an APRN to 
testify as to the standard of care applicable to the defendant-
physiatrist.303 The APRN submitted an affidavit on behalf of the 
plaintiff in an effort to resist the defendant-physiatrist’s motion for 
summary judgment.304 The trial court struck the affidavit.305 The 
                                                                                                                 
 297. Id. 
 298. Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 982 P.2d 565, 566 (Utah 1999). Physiatrists are specialists in 
physical and rehabilitation medicine. See Stuart M. Weinstein, Defining Physiatry: A Tolerance for 
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Utah Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s disposition of the 
affidavit, stating: 
[A]n expert affidavit must provide sufficient foundation to 
show that the expert is qualified to testify as to the standard 
of care. Lowe is an advanced-practice registered nurse 
specializing in rehabilitative care for victims of spinal cord 
injury. Although [she] is well-qualified in rehabilitative 
care, her affidavit lacks the necessary facts to establish that 
the standard of care for a registered nurse specializing in 
rehabilitative care is the same for a physician providing 
post-operative care.306 
The court neither indicated which “necessary facts” were lacking 
in the affidavit nor pronounced that an advanced-practice nurse could 
opine on the medical standard of care.307 
Advanced-practice registered nurses and nurse practitioners are 
well-trained and, subject to state licensing laws, are able to practice 
with some independence.308 They are not, however, physicians.309 
Courts are wise to adopt a conservative approach to advanced-
practice registered nurses or nurse practitioner experts and to prohibit 
their standard of care testimony against physicians. 
XIII.   The Nurse 
Simply stated, courts have had no difficulty determining that 
nurses cannot provide medical standard of care testimony against 
physicians.310 These decisions may be informed by professional 
licensing statutes that detail the actual authority of physicians and 
                                                                                                                 
 306. Id. at 571. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Advanced Practice Nursing Fact Sheet, NURSE J. SOC. COMMUNITY FOR NURSES WORLDWIDE, 
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nurses, statutes requiring expert testimony in medical negligence 
cases, rules of evidence, or judicial precedent.311 Nurses have been 
precluded from offering standard of care testimony against a general 
surgeon,312 emergency medicine physicians,313 oncologists,314 an 
internist,315 a thoracic surgeon, radiologist,316 a psychiatrist,317 family 
medicine physicians,318 and an urologist.319 The Supreme Court of 
Georgia and Court of Appeals of Georgia, in 1980 and 1993, 
respectively, held that a nurse could testify to the medical standard of 
care regarding the sterility of a needle used to draw blood320 and to 
the medical standard of care applicable to giving an injection.321 The 
state supreme court opined “that the drawing of blood is not 
treatment exclusively within the professional skills of medical 
doctors,”322 and the court of appeals reached a similar conclusion 
regarding the administration of an injection.323 It should be noted that 
these Georgia decisions appear to have been abrogated by statute.324 
It has been suggested that “[n]urses are the major non-physician 
workforce in primary care teams in the U.S. . . . .”325 Scholarship 
concerning physician-nurse conflicts notes: 
That the occupations clash because nurses and physicians 
structure work in radically different ways and though they 
work side by side, they tend to misunderstand the methods 
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and inner logic of one another’s work. For example, nurses 
work on a strictly scheduled hourly basis, sense that a 
scarcity of resources exists, and are assigned work by room 
or bed. In contrast, physicians work on a course of illness 
or case basis and sense an abundance of resources. While 
the physician’s sense of mastery is strong, often the nurse’s 
sense of mastery is weak . . . .326 
Beyond these differences between physicians and nurses is the 
difference in education.327 “The physician is trained to make 
decisions concerning what treatment is best and the nurse is not.”328 
Whether courts appreciate these differences is unknown. Whether 
these differences could inform court decisions in a subliminal manner 
is also unknown. Nevertheless, courts understand or believe that 
nurses and physicians occupy distinct professions and that nurses are 
not qualified to testify to the applicable medical standard of care. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to survey court decisions regarding 
a significant but not routinely commented on evidentiary issue: cross-
disciplinary expert testimony by non-physicians against physicians 
regarding the applicable medical standard of care. The most direct 
and elementary approach to this issue is to note that physicians are 
different than non-physicians in their education, training, and 
experience, and therefore, it should be impermissible for a court to 
permit a non-physician to opine on a physician’s standard of care. 
However, some courts have held that it is not the professional degree 
earned but the knowledge gained by the expert that determines the 
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qualifications of the non-physician expert to opine on the medical 
standard of care.329 This “common knowledge” approach may appear 
attractive but is not without its shortcomings. 
This paper urges that knowledge of the standard of care is, alone, 
insufficient to qualify a non-physician expert to opine on the medical 
standard of care. How that knowledge was acquired is crucial. The 
non-physician does not benefit from the context gained by the 
physician.330 Typically, the non-physician expert has not acquired 
knowledge in the process of treating patients.331 This lack of context 
should be the disqualifying factor. 
This having been said, the solution of the issue is difficult and not 
at all clear. There may be a legitimate argument that non-physicians 
should be qualified to opine on the medical standard of care 
applicable to a physician. This is the case because as non-physician 
healthcare professionals—for example, nurse practitioners and nurse 
anesthetists—provide increased primary and other healthcare, 
perhaps as a result of a shortage of physicians in these practice areas, 
these non-physicians perform functions that overlap with or 
substitute for those performed by physicians.332 
For a court to determine that a non-physician expert actually 
knows the medical standard of care, the court must understand the 
medicine involved in the litigation, a topic about which courts are not 
particularly proficient.333 This understanding derives only from an in-
depth study of the facts, the non-physician’s actual credentials, and 
experience. This decision should not be made lightly. In most cases, 
likely the large majority of cases, courts should not permit non-
physician expert witnesses to opine on the medical standard of care. 
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